In recent weeks, two bipartisan groups of lawmakers—one in the Senate and one in the House—proposed commissions aimed at addressing the impending insolvency of the Social Security Trust Fund. Both deserve credit for proposing something, since most of their colleagues are silent on Social Security reform. But unless carefully designed, these groups are more often excuses for inaction than prods for durable solutions.

Without action, the old age retirement system will become insolvent sometime in 2032, just six years from now, threatening a 22% across the board cut in benefits.

One of the proposals has more potential than the other. But the reality is, these sorts of bipartisan commissions only work when a president throws his full weight behind them and Congress really wants to fix a problem, rather than find an excuse to continue to do nothing.

To put it another way, commissions must be designed to force action rather than become an opportunity for inaction.

Nobody needs a panel of experts to develop ideas. We’ve known for decades how to fix the system. Congress instead needs to find the political will to act. A properly designed commission could help.

The Senate Version

The Senate version, called the PROMISE Act, was introduced by seven lawmakers, four Republicans and three Democrats. They include Republicans Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, Thom Tillis of North Carolina, John Cornyn of Texas, and Alan Armstrong of North Carolina, as well as Democrats Tim Kaine of Virginia, Dick Durbin of Illinois and Angus King of Maine, an independent who votes with Democrats.

It is hard not to notice that four of the sponsors—Cassidy, Tillis, Cornyn, and Durbin—are lame ducks, not exactly a leading indicator of future legislative strength.

The second problem is their plan lets Congress water down any commission recommendations. Their advisory board would make suggestions that congressional committees could revise. Any plan would require a super majority to pass the Senate and a simple majority in the House.

Amendments still would have to ensure Social Security is solvent for 50 years, just like the basic recommendations. But opportunity for legislative mischief never is a good idea.

One positive: This idea is far better than an earlier plan from two of this bill’s sponsors, Cassidy and Kaine. That would have had the US Treasury borrow $1.5 trillion and invest the money in a diversified portfolio. Income from the fund would be used to help restore solvency to the Social Security Trust fund.

In fact, Congress likely will end up borrowing trillions of dollars to keep paying promised benefits. And investing for long-term obligations should include stocks and bonds. But starting the debate over solvency by agreeing to borrow massive amounts of money before enacting structural reform is exactly the wrong idea.

That means explicitly raising payroll taxes and restricting benefits, the two steps lawmakers are loath to take. Then, and only then, should Congress borrow what it needs to get the system through the inevitable transition.

Had Congress dealt with the Social Security funding problem decades ago, this bridge loan would not be necessary. But here we are.

The House Version

The House bill, called the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act of 2026, was sponsored by representatives Tom Cole (R-OK) and Tom Suozzi (D-NY).

It would create a 13-member commission made up of lawmakers and outside experts, appointed by the president and the bipartisan leaders of Congress. The group would have one year to develop recommendations.

If nine panel members agree on a plan, it would be sent directly to the House and Senate for an up-or-down vote within three days. No changes allowed.

In one sense, all these pro-commission lawmakers understand Congress won’t pass those tax increase and benefit changes unless it is somehow forced to. A well-designed commission may be able to do that.

A Sad History

The history of past commissions is clear, and depressing. My bookcase is filled with high-minded proposals made by expert panels, mostly to address budget deficits. Many included excellent suggestions. None went anywhere.

Congress either never voted on them at all or watered them down with so many legislative loopholes that they were rendered meaningless.

To understand commissions, think about two, the base closing commission in the late 1980s and the 1981-1983 commission to restore solvency to Social Security, the so-called Greenspan Commission.

The history of the Greenspan group is instructive because it initially failed. Its members could not agree on reforms. But with just months before the retirement system was to go insolvent, a small group of congressional leaders and representatives of the Reagan Administration developed their own plan, which the full commission finally accepted.

Faced with a looming deadline, Congress approved a revised version of that proposal in 1983.

A Success Story

The best example of a successful panel was the congressional base closing commission that was created in 1988.

Congress empowered this group of experts because its leadership recognized obsolete military bases needed to be closed or consolidated but individual lawmakers would inevitably block any changes to protect their home state facilities.

To avoid that bottleneck and give all lawmakers some deniability when local bases were closed, Congress gave the job to an independent commission.

It worked because it included the ultimate hammer: If Congress did not vote to reject the recommendations as a single package, they’d automatically take effect.

That’s the sort of forcing mechanism Congress will need if it is going to raise taxes and restructure benefits, which will inevitably be included in any proposals.

That brings us back to the role of the president. No reform, whether commission-based or otherwise, has a chance without the strong, public support of the White House.  We’ve not had that for years.

Since Social Security is scheduled to go insolvent in 2032, the mess will land in the lap of the next president.

2028 candidates will need to confront the issue head-on if they are to have the necessary political capital to demand tough decisions on a hot-button issue. That means Social Security ought to be a top priority in the 2028 president campaign.

Maybe that will happen. And maybe the candidate who makes it an issue will win. Then, and only then, will a well-designed commission help.